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Aristotle on natural slavery*
MALCOLM HEATH (UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS) 
ABSTRACT: Aristotle’s claim that natural slaves do not possess autonomous 
rationality (Pol. 1.5, 1254b20-23) cannot plausibly be interpreted in an 
unrestricted sense, since this would conflict with what Aristotle knew about non-
Greek societies. Aristotle’s argument requires only a lack of autonomous 
practical rationality. An impairment of the capacity for integrated practical 
deliberation, resulting from an environmentally induced excess or deficiency in 
thumos (Pol. 7.7, 1327b18-31), would be sufficient to make natural slaves 
incapable of eudaimonia without being obtrusively implausible relative to what 
Aristotle is likely to have believed about non-Greeks. Since Aristotle seems to 
have believed that the existence of people who can be enslaved without injustice 
is a hypothetical necessity, if those capable of eudaimonia are to achieve it, the 
existence of natural slaves has implications for our understanding of Aristotle’s 
natural teleology. 
KEYWORDS: Aristotle, slavery, deliberation, thumos, teleology  
Aristotle believed that the majority of human beings may be enslaved without 
injustice, because they are slaves by nature. That belief has not endeared him to 
modern interpreters: John McDowell, for example, finds it ‘embarrassing’.1 Just 
as we tend to avert our gaze from embarrassing sights we pass in the street, so 
Aristotelian specialists seem reluctant to invest in the theory of natural slavery the 
boundless energy that has been devoted to making sense of, for example, 
Metaphysics Z. The theory is, indeed, easy to dismiss: we know that it is false; we 
can easily explain it away as a product of ideological bias;2 and Aristotle gives a 
very inadequate account of it. The question of slavery arises in Politics 1, where it 
is incidental to his main concern, the diversity of political authority (Pol. 1.1, 
1252a7-16);3 he therefore offers no more than a sketch of the theory, full of gaps 
 
* This paper’s completion was made possible by an award under the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council’s Research Leave scheme (grant reference AH/D501210/1), with additional support from 
the University of Leeds. Successively less deficient versions were given to the Classical 
Association annual conference (April 2006), the Leeds Classics Research Seminar (January 2007), 
and the Northern Association for Ancient Philosophy (March 2007); I am grateful to the audiences 
on each occasion for comments and encouragement.   
1 McDowell 1995, 201: ‘this embarrassing feature of Aristotle’s thinking.’ Cf. Schofield 1999, 115: 
‘Aristotle’s views on slavery are an embarrassment to those who otherwise hold his philosophy in 
high regard’; Kraut 2002, 277: ‘a deeply disturbing feature of his political thought.’  
2 Too easily for this to have much point. Schofield 1999 largely resists the temptation (216 n.43: ‘I 
am not here concerned with praise or blame, but with understanding the theoretical framework 
within which the idea of natural slavery might come to seem inevitable’), but not entirely (133: 
‘Aristotle accepted that most slaves in his own society were natural slaves. No doubt his 
assumption is to be explained in ideological terms’). More illuminating explanations of the kind of 
error in question are suggested by empirically based cognitive and social psychology (see n.22 
below).  
3 Deslauriers 2006. 
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and apparent inconsistencies. That is not unusual in Aristotle, and in other parts of 
the corpus scholars work hard to fill gaps and resolve inconsistencies. Here, 
ideological repugnance has proved a deterrent. But Aristotle has a good track-
record for intelligent reasoning. If in this case he reasons intelligently from beliefs 
that I do not share to conclusions that I reject and deplore, I see no cause for 
embarrassment. In this paper I shall look for an interpretation of the theory of 
natural slavery that is credible, in the sense of being broadly coherent and 
plausible, relative to things that Aristotle is likely to have believed, and shall 
examine some of the theory’s wider implications.4
1. Diagnosis  
(a) A misdiagnosis: comprehensive failure of autonomous reason 
I start from an interpretation that fails to meet that condition. Aristotle regards 
reason as distinctive to human beings, and he seems to state clearly that natural 
slaves ‘are human and have a share in reason’ (Pol. 1.13, 1259b27-8). But 
elsewhere he qualifies that statement: a natural slave ‘shares in reason to the 
extent of understanding it, but does not have it himself’ (Pol. 1.5, 1254b20-23). 
We know from the ethical treatises that in humans the non-rational part of the 
soul, the part which perceives and desires, is also in a sense rational: although it is 
not capable of reasoning, it can be responsive to reason (NE 1.13, 1102b30-3a3; 
EE 2.1, 1219b26-32). If this provides his model for natural slaves, then Aristotle’s 
suggestion is that, though slaves can be responsive to the reasoned instructions of 
a master, they have no capacity for reasoning autonomously.5 But that is not a 
credible interpretation. The problem is not that it conflicts with the facts: that can 
be said of many things that Aristotle believed. What is crucial is that it conflicts 
with what Aristotle must have taken to be the facts. Consistency with things that 
would have been perfectly obvious to Aristotle must provide a crucial constraint 
on the plausibility of any interpretation of his theory. 
Aristotle believed that non-Greeks (b£rbaroi) are natural slaves (Pol. 1.2, 
1252b5-9; 1.6, 1255a28-b2; 3.14, 1285a19-21).6 Many purported facts about non-
Greek peoples were recorded in the literature available to enquirers in Aristotle’s 
day, and the subject is one which he researched: he wrote a work on non-Greek 
customs (nÒmima barbarik£), a subject which he regarded as useful for 
                                                 
4 Since the theory entails that I (as a Northern European) am a natural slave and may be enslaved 
without injustice, it should be needless to labour the point that I am not remotely tempted to accept 
the theory or to defend it in any larger sense. But, for the record, I do not believe that any human 
beings fit Aristotle’s account of natural slaves as reconstructed here; nor do I believe that, if they 
did, it would be just to enslave them.   
5 Fortenbaugh 1977; Kraut 2002, 283. Despite the disagreements recorded below, I regard Kraut’s 
discussion (277-305) as extremely helpful; it is also unusually generous in its acknowledgement 
that ‘Aristotle’s framework for thinking about this subject was internally consistent and even 
contained a limited amount of explanatory power’ (278). 
6 It does not follow that this is true of every individual non-Greek, without exception. For 
Aristotle, natural processes are relatively robust tendencies, not exceptionless rules (e.g. Pol. 1.5, 
1254b2734; 1.6, 1255b3-4). See Kraut 2002, 294 n.31.  
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legislative science (Rhet. 1.4, 1360a30-8).7 Although that work is lost, his ethical 
and political writings contain numerous comments on non-Greek peoples. When 
he notes that some distant non-Greek peoples are by nature lacking in rationality 
(¢lÒgistoi) and live by perception alone, like non-human animals (NE 7.5, 
1149a9-11), he implicitly acknowledges the rationality of most non-Greeks, 
especially those nearest and most familiar. That is no surprise. Aristotle cannot 
have failed to be aware that, left to themselves, non-Greeks were able to organise 
societies that were viable, though defective.8 Some of them could plan and 
execute logistically complex projects (such as Xerxes’ invasion of Greece). Some 
of them had technologically advanced cultures. The Egyptians invented 
mathematics (Met. 1.1, 981b13-25);9 they and the Babylonians were good 
astronomers (DC 2.12, 292a7-9). How could they manage any of these things, if 
they were wholly incapable of autonomous reasoning?  
(b) An impairment of practical reason 
So Aristotle could not have believed that natural slaves suffer from a 
comprehensive failure of autonomous rationality. But that leaves open the 
possibility of a more limited failure. Aristotle recognises different kinds of 
rationality. The evidence mentioned above shows that non-Greeks must be 
capable of technical and theoretical reasoning.10 What about practical reason?11 
The distinction between practical and technical rationality is clarified by the 
distinction between practical wisdom (frÒnhsij) and art (tšcnh) (NE 6.4-5). 
                                                 
7 Periegetic literature, recommended here, is cited at Pol. 2.3, 1262a18-21.  
8 Viability might seem inconsistent with Pol. 1.2, 1252a30-34, which grounds the distinction 
between natural ruler and natural subject in the slave’s lack foresight with regard to survival. But 
the context refers to the earliest stages of social development, and we should be cautious about 
extrapolating these comments to larger social organisations. It is the establishment of self-
sustaining communities that allows the horizon of human concern to extend beyond the mere 
preservation of life to living a good life (Pol. 1.2, 1252b27-30), i.e. a life of fine actions (Pol. 3.9, 
1280b40-1a4). What is at stake for the isolated household with which Aristotle’s account begins is 
survival, for which instrumental competence suffices. Practical wisdom can only come into 
question as a legitimating quality for the master-slave relationship when the household becomes a 
locus for the pursuit of the good life, i.e. when it is part of a polis.  
9 This invention was not, in Aristotle’s view, driven by instrumental applications: it is because 
mathematics neither meets essential needs nor provides pleasurable luxuries that an advanced 
society able to sustain a leisured class (such as the Egyptian priests) was its precondition. Contrast 
Herodotus’ conjecture (2.109) that geometry was invented in Egypt for application in land 
allocation and tax assessment.  
10 Since tšcnh in its strict definition involves rationality (NE 6.4, 1140a10; cf. Met. 1.1, 981a5-30), 
the claim that Asiatics are intelligent and ‘technical’ (Pol. 7.7, 1327b27-8) seems to provide 
explicit evidence that (some) non-Greeks are capable of technical rationality. Admittedly, tšcnh 
can be emulated by habitual skills acquired and exercised without understanding (what Aristotle 
calls ™mpeir…a: Met. 1.1, 981a12-15), or even by instinctive animal behaviour (HA 7.1, 588a28-31; 
cf. 8.11, 615a18-9; 8.13, 616a4-6; 8.37, 620b10-11; 8.38, 622b22-24). However, building 
pyramids and invading Greece are not like nesting or spinning a web: they are not ‘a mere matter 
of finding instrumental means to simple ends’, following ‘fixed rules’ that eliminate the need for 
‘adaptability and ingenuity’ (Kraut 2002, 289). The complexity of such projects demands more 
than an instinct or tacit knack.  
11 For this tripartition: Met. 6.1, 1025b25; cf. NE 6.2, 1139a26-31; EE 1.1, 1214a8-12; Top. 6.6, 
145a15-18.  
3 
MALCOLM HEATH, ARISTOTLE ON NATURAL SLAVERY 
Practical wisdom is concerned with action (pr©xij), art with production 
(po…hsij). There are two differences. First, production is not intrinsically 
valuable, but derives whatever value it has from the product; by contrast, good 
action is intrinsically valuable (that is, chosen on account of itself: NE 2.4, 
1105a31-2; 6.3, 1144a18-20; 10.6, 1176b6-10). Secondly, art does not tell you 
what you should do; it only tells you conditionally what you should do if you want 
to make the product. You must look elsewhere to determine whether the product is 
worth making. In fact, you must look to practical wisdom, which is (in Aristotle’s 
term) ‘architectonic’ (NE 1.2, 1094a26-8;12 6.7, 1141b21-4; cf. EE 1.6, 1217a6-7): 
it provides overall guidance for life. 
Aristotle says that natural slaves cannot achieve eudaimonia, the best kind of 
human life (Pol. 3.9, 1280a31-4). The reason they cannot do so is that eudaimonia 
consists in virtuous activity (NE 10.6, 1177a6-11). That places it beyond the scope 
of technical rationality. To explain an inability to live a virtuous human life, it is 
necessary to invoke a failure of ‘architectonic’ practical reason. So it is plausible 
to suppose that this is the kind of rationality that Aristotle denies to natural slaves. 
His apparently unrestricted formulations are shorthand expressions; there was no 
point in spelling out qualifications which are entailed by obvious facts about non-
Greeks, and which are implied by a context in which only rationality in ethics is 
relevant. When Aristotle says that a natural slave ‘shares in reason to the extent of 
understanding it, but does not have it himself’, therefore, he is thinking 
specifically of practical reason.13
(c) An impairment of deliberation 
In what way is a natural slave’s capacity for practical reason impaired? One 
possibility would be that he cannot formulate the right kind of concept: that 
conceptions of right and wrong have no meaning for him. But this, too, is 
something that Aristotle could not have believed. For Aristotle, an important 
distinction between humans and other animals is that, whereas other animals can 
communicate with each other about sources of pleasure and distress, only humans 
have an awareness of, and a capacity to communicate about, what is advantageous 
and harmful, right and wrong (Pol. 1.2, 1253a7-18). It would contradict the 
ethnographic data to deny that natural slaves can communicate about what is right 
and wrong. Even the barbarous Triballians have a concept of what is kalon (fine, 
noble, intrinsically worthwhile).14 Admittedly, their conception is terribly flawed: 
they think it is kalon to sacrifice their fathers (Top. 2.11, 115b22-6). But they do 
have the concept, and are motivated by it.  
                                                 
12 Referring to politics, which is the same ›xij as practical wisdom, though different in being (NE 
7.8, 1141b23-4). 
13 This restriction is recognised by Brunt 1993, 362; ‘it is the power of deliberation that precedes 
moral choice... which a natural slave lacks’; Garver 1994, 178: ‘Slaves have the reasoning ability 
necessary for technê, and so obviously deliberate well in a narrow sense of performing 
instrumental reasoning. A clever slave is no contradiction in terms.’  
14 Rhet. 1.9, 1366a33-4: ‘whatever, being worthy of choice for itself, is praiseworthy, or whatever, 
being good, is pleasant because it is good’ (Ö ¨n di' aØtÕ aƒretÕn ×n ™painetÕn Ï, À Ö ¨n 
¢gaqÕn ×n ¹dÝ Ï, Óti ¢gaqÒn). Cf. EE 8.3, 1248b18-20. 
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The Triballian’s conception of what is kalon is deeply misguided. Perhaps, 
then, the root of the slave’s impairment lies in a profound dysfunction in the 
capacity to recognise ends: an incapacity to make properly reasoned judgements 
about right and wrong. How else could the Triballians have failed to identify their 
barbarous misconception about what is kalon? But Aristotle says something 
different. Natural slaves are incapable of prohairesis and eudaimonia (Pol. 3.9, 
1280a31-4). These two incapacities are linked: there is no eudaimonia without 
virtuous action; and there is no virtuous action without prohairesis (for example, 
NE 2.6, 1106b36; 6.2, 1139a22-3; EE 3.7, 1234a23-6). Prohairesis is deliberated 
choice (for example, NE 3.3, 1113a9-12; 6.2, 1139a23; EE 2.10, 1226b13-23); and 
natural slaves lack the capacity for deliberation (Pol. 1.13, 1260a12). The slave’s 
inability to achieve eudaimonia is therefore ultimately rooted in this deliberative 
incapacity. But prohairesis and deliberation are both concerned with ‘the things 
directed towards the ends’ (NE 3.3, 1112b11-15, 33-4; EE 2.10, 1226a7-13, b9-13, 
27a7-24). So the natural slave’s deliberative incapacity is not a failure of reasoned 
judgement about ends; ends are proposed by character, not by inferential 
reasoning (sullogismÒj: EE 2.11, 1227b22-5, b34-8a2; cf. NE 7.8, 1151a15-
19).15 Deliberative incapacity impairs reasoning from ends to their 
implementations.  
Deliberation is reasoning back from a goal to the action required to implement 
that goal (EE 2.10, 1226b12-13). Reasoning of the form ‘because of that, this is to 
be done’ is a form of causal reasoning, in the sense that the goal explains the 
action; it is the final cause: it explains why that is the thing to do (EE 2.10, 
1226b25-9). The behaviour of non-human animals can also be explained in terms 
of final causes. The peacock displays in order to mate with a peahen; the zebra 
runs in order to escape the lion. But the animal’s behaviour is driven directly by 
the pleasure or distress which attends its perceptions (or expectations); it is not 
mediated by an understanding of the behaviour’s (final) cause. Non-human 
animals do not understand causes, and therefore cannot engage in causal 
reasoning; the same is true of human children.16 So neither is capable of 
deliberation or prohairesis (EE 2.10, 1226b21-5). 
Children, unlike non-human animals, grow out of this incapacity. They 
become capable of deliberation. Or some of them do: when Aristotle contrasts 
children, who have a potential for deliberation which has not yet matured, with 
slaves, whose deliberative capacity is permanently impaired (Pol. 1.13, 1260a12-
14), it goes without saying that naturally servile children grow up to become 
adults with the servile deliberative incapacity. But this does not mean that they 
                                                 
15 This is not, of course, the whole story. The relevant kinds of end are inaccessible to animals 
without reason (they are motivated solely by pleasure and distress). Moreover, the existence of the 
ethical treatises shows that inferential reasoning about ends is not pointless. However, Aristotle 
holds that argument is not necessary to discover the starting-points of action if one has a properly 
formed character (NE 1.4,1095b3-8), and is useless if one does not (NE 2.4, 1105b12-18; 10.9, 
1179b4-31); and there is a risk of being misled by bad arguments (EE 1.6, 1216b40-17a17). 
Relevant discussions include Tuozzo 1991; Smith 1996; Vasiliou 1996.  
16 Children resemble non-human animals: NE 3.2, 1111b6-10; 6.13, 1144b8-9; 7.12, 1153a30-35; 
EE 2.8, 1224a25-30; 2.10, 1226b21-5; Phys. 2.6, 197b5-8; HA 8.1, 588a31-b3. 
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remain in a childlike state.17 The adult slave’s incapacity differs from the child’s 
in two ways. First, the adult ‘shares in reason to the extent of understanding it’, 
while small children are not yet able even to understand reason. Aristotle is quite 
clear about this difference: ‘those who deny reason to slaves and say that one 
should only give orders are wrong: slaves should be admonished [nouqethtšon] 
more than children’ (Pol. 1.5, 1260b5-7); by contrast, children’s behaviour must 
be steered by pleasure and distress (NE 10.1, 1172a20-1). Though the slave needs 
a master’s admonition to make up for his deliberative incapacity, that admonition 
is only of use to him because he is responsive to deliberative reasoning that he 
would be incapable of producing himself. The child is not yet able to deliberate; 
the adult slave is not able to deliberate independently. Secondly, natural slaves are 
capable of technical reason, which involves a form of deliberation.18 Craftsmen 
may have to work out solutions to novel problems; Xerxes’ generals had to solve 
the logistical problems involved in invading Greece. The child is incapable of any 
kind of deliberation; the adult slave is incapable of independent practical 
deliberation. 
(d) An impairment of global deliberation 
That may seem a puzzling incapacity. A clever Triballian craftsman spends all 
day in his workshop working out how to make a novelty pot to sell to Greek 
tourists; on his way home it occurs to him that he should do something fine and 
noble; he knows that sacrificing one’s father is fine and noble; why should he not 
be able to work out how to do that? Why should causal reasoning of the form 
‘because of that, this is to be done’ fail in one domain, but not another? 
Consider a simple example of practical reasoning. I see a destitute person who 
is hungry and has nothing to eat. I recognise that it would be kalon to help him, 
and want to do so. How can I help? I could help by giving him food; and here is 
some food. So I shall give him this food. But perhaps that would be wrong. Here 
is some food, but the food belongs to someone else—and it would be disgraceful 
to steal. In that case I ought not give the food. I should pursue my goal by other 
means (perhaps by persuading the owner to donate the food, or finding other food 
which I have a right to dispose of). A practical reasoner must consider, not just 
what can be done to implement a goal, but what can be done consistently with the 
action still being fine, since virtuous action is performed because of (or for the 
sake of) to kalon.19 Practical reasoning must integrate a multiplicity of morally 
relevant considerations.  
Aristotle makes the following distinction with regard to deliberation: ‘good 
deliberation in the unqualified sense... is what succeeds in relation to the end in 
                                                 
17 ‘Childlike’ is used too freely in Schofield 1999, 124-8 (cf. 132: ‘it was reasonable to try to 
identify a specific form of rule appropriate to the childlike’). 
18 Kraut, though denying that natural slaves are ‘helpless mental invalids’ (2002, 283-4), thinks 
that they are incapable of technical as well as practical deliberation (285-90, 292; cf. 304 n.48 for 
theoretical reason). Contra n.10 above. 
19 NE 3.7, 1115b12-13, 20-4; 3.8, 1116b2-3, 1117a8-9, 17; 3.9, 1117b9, 13-15; 3.12, 1119b16; 4.1, 
1120a23-9, 1121b3-5; 4.2, 1122b6-7; 4.3, 1123a24-5; 9.8, 1168a33-4; 10.8, 1178b12-13; EE 3.1, 
1229a1-9, 30a26-32; 8.3, 1248b18-22, 34-7, 49a5-6, 13-14.  
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the unqualified sense, good deliberation in the particular sense in relation to some 
particular end’ (NE 6.9, 1142b29-31). Practical wisdom involves unqualified 
deliberation, the ability ‘to deliberate well about what is good and beneficial for 
[one]self, not in particular respects... but about what sorts of thing conduce to 
living a good life in general’ (NE 6.5, 1140a25-8). Perhaps, then, what natural 
slaves lack is the capacity for that kind of global deliberation. They can plan steps 
to implement a particular moral goal, but they cannot build into that planning the 
sensitivity to a wide range of moral considerations that is necessary if one is to 
achieve the coherence of a life that is lived well in general. If that is right, then it 
is possible to see how there can be a deliberative incapacity that leaves the natural 
slave’s technical ability unimpaired. Technical and practical deliberation differ in 
this respect: although technical reasoning may involve the integration of 
competing demands (trading off a structure’s strength and weight, for example), it 
is not architectonic, and is therefore not subject to the same constraint of global 
integration.  
(e) The failure of executive control 
If natural slaves are unable to engage in global deliberation, their actions will 
not be guided by a stable architectonic conception of the good life. They will 
inevitably pursue a series of uncoordinated particular goals. But living without the 
guidance of a stable conception of the overall good is not unique to natural slaves: 
there are Greeks who live like that through their own fecklessness (NE 1.4, 
1095a23-5; EE 1.2, 1214b6-11). These people do not provide a satisfactory model 
for the natural slave’s impairment. Although their architectonic conception of the 
good life changes erratically, there is no reason to doubt that these feckless Greeks 
are able to deliberate in relation to whatever conception they happen to hold at a 
given time; natural slaves are not. So we must look deeper. 
Consider a more radical folly: the failure to have any ultimate goal at all. If 
there is nothing that is chosen for itself, desire is rendered futile by an infinite 
regress: each thing is chosen for the sake of something else, which is in turn 
chosen for the sake of something else, and so on (NE 1.2, 1094a18-21). In the 
Protrepticus (F43 Düring = Iamblichus Protr. 52.16-53.14), Aristotle highlights 
the laughable ignorance of those who always ask ‘what use is this?’ We must 
come to rest in something that we choose, not because it leads to something else, 
but because it is intrinsically worth choosing. But suppose you are the kind of 
person who does always ask ‘what use is this?’ Nothing you do has intrinsic 
validity; everything is required to lead to an outcome that will supply it with 
extrinsic validation. This means that action (pr©xij) collapses into production; all 
your deliberation becomes technical deliberation—which is within the powers of 
natural slaves. Unfortunately, because of the regress, the extrinsic validation you 
seek is never achieved, so your deliberation is rendered futile. If your decision-
making resources are limited to technical deliberation that is not anchored by an 
architectonic conception of intrinsic value, you cannot live a meaningful life.20
                                                 
20 Aristotle does not claim that the addressees of the Protrepticus are actually in this predicament: 
if they were, his strategy for discrediting the objection that philosophy is useless would fail. 
Having pointed out that the objection cannot be generalised without absurdity, he goes on to show 
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Yet this too does not provide a satisfactory model. We have already seen that 
the natural slave need not lack a conception of intrinsic value: the well brought up 
Triballian sees sacrificing his father as kalon, and therefore worth choosing for 
itself. The problem, then, is not that he lacks this conception; it must be that it 
fails to anchor his deliberation. When Aristotle discusses weakness of will he 
shows that there are various ways in which judgements which a person holds, and 
can articulate, may become detached from executive control of behaviour (NE 7.3, 
1146b31-47a24). If that detachment recurs persistently, we may doubt whether the 
person really understands what he is saying; perhaps he is just parroting the 
words. But that need not be the case. I persistently perform badly at the kind of 
test of spatial reasoning that involves identifying which of several drawings of 
three-dimensional objects is a rotation (or other transformation) of the object in a 
sample image. It is not that I do not understand the relevant spatial concepts; I just 
cannot apply them in practice.21 But when I am shown the right answer, I have no 
problem in understanding why it is right. I am deficient in autonomous spatial 
reasoning, but am able to follow the guidance of a competent spatial reasoner. If 
solving such puzzles were the key to a worthwhile human life, I would be a 
natural slave. 
(f) Conclusion 
Natural slaves, then, suffer from an impairment that is limited in several 
ways: it is an impairment of the capacity for practical (not technical or 
theoretical) reasoning; it is an impairment of the capacity for deliberation (not a 
conceptual or motivational failure); it is an impairment of the capacity for global 
deliberation; and it is an impairment that disrupts deliberation by detaching an 
individual’s conception of intrinsic value from executive control of his behaviour. 
Yet, though the impairment is limited in these ways, its consequences are 
profound. In every other respect a natural slave may be extremely intelligent; but 
he lacks the capacity to make reasoned judgements about what he should do 
consistently with his conception of living well in general. And this renders him 
incapable of living a worthwhile human life.22
                                                                                                                                     
that the objectors are in fact motivated by intrinsic value in the absence of further instrumental 
advantage (F44 = Iamblichus 53.15-54.5). The final move is to suggest that the addressees’ 
existing commitments to intrinsic value (as spectators of athletics and theatrical performances) 
actually point the way to the greater intrinsic value of philosophy.  
21 This incapacity is connected with my very weak visual imagination: I cannot manipulate the 
objects in thought and ‘see’ how they look. 
22 An impairment that is limited in scope, but profound in its effects, is just what is needed if we 
are to understand how it retained its credibility in Aristotle’s eyes. The rest can be left to 
confirmation bias (e.g. Nickerson 1998) and attribution error (e.g. Ross and Anderson 1982; 
Gilbert and Malone 1995; cf. Brunt 1993, 379-80). The power of roles in a hierarchical 
relationship to bias the perception of traits has been demonstrated even under experimental 
conditions, when participants knew that roles had been assigned randomly (Humphrey 1985).  
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2. Aetiology  
(a) The influence of climate 
How did the natural slave get that way? By living in the wrong place. 
Aristotle observes that Greeks are mid-way geographically between Europeans, 
who live in a cold climate, and Asiatics; and they are mid-way between them in 
terms of character and intelligence as well (Pol. 7.7, 1327b18-31). The clear 
implication is that the differences are caused by the climatic variations. 
Environmental explanations were certainly current in Aristotle’s day.23
Greeks are spirited (œnqumoj) and intelligent (dianohtikÒj); Europeans are 
full of spirit, but lacking in intelligence and art; Asiatics are intelligent and 
technically-minded, but lacking in spirit (¥qumoj). Thus the European climate 
produces over-stimulated spirit (thumos) while impairing intelligence; the Asiatic 
climate leaves intelligence unimpaired while producing under-stimulated spirit.24 
The unimpaired intelligence attributed to Asiatics must refer to technical and 
theoretical intelligence, since we have already recognised that practical 
intelligence is impaired in Asiatics and Europeans alike.  
There is no reason why climate should not exercise a direct influence on 
reasoning capacity. Intellect (noàj) as such is not embodied (DA 2.1, 413a3-7; 3.4, 
429a10-29), but thinking is. For thought is ‘not without’ phantasia (DA 1.1, 
403a8-10; 3.7, 431a14-17; 3.8, 432a7-14); deliberation, in particular, involves 
‘deliberative’ (as distinct from perceptual) phantasia (DA 3.11, 434a5-10; cf. 3.10, 
433b29); and the faculty of phantasia is the same as the perceptual faculty 
(Insomn. 1, 459a14-22).25 The exercise of human rationality therefore depends on 
the embodied capacities for perception and desire, and so is potentially sensitive 
to environmental effects on human physiology.26 However, if the influence of 
climate on intelligence were direct, we might expect it to affect all forms of 
reasoning; yet in Asiatics, technical and theoretical reasoning are not impaired. 
We should therefore consider the possibility that the effect on intelligence is, in 
whole or part, an indirect consequence of the diverse effects of climate on thumos. 
If so, then the domain-specificity of the natural slave’s cognitive impairment is 
                                                 
23 Hippocrates Airs, Waters, Places 12-24. Hippocrates’ account recognises a greater variety of 
factors, and is not based on a Greek/non-Greek polarity: see Jouanna 1999, 211-32; Thomas 2000, 
86-98; Sassi 2001, 105-20; Isaac 2004, 56-82 (and on Aristotle’s theory of slavery also 175-81, 
211-3).  
24 The implication is that environmental conditions that deviate from the norm produce 
compensatory internal deviations: an excessively cold climate must be offset by excessive internal 
heat (requiring a hot, and therefore spirited, nature); an excessively hot climate suppresses internal 
heat (producing a cold, and therefore fearful, nature). Thus Probl. 4.15, 910a28-b8 (cf. 14.8, 
909b9-15; 10.60, 898a4-8). Cf. PA 2.4, 650b35 for thumos as productive of heat; the whole chapter 
discusses the physiological basis of the association between heat and thumos on the one hand, and 
intelligence, fearfulness and cold on the other. Compare the contrast between young and old in 
Rhet. 2.12-13 (1389a17-19, 1389b29-32).  
25 It is a dysfunction of the faculty of phantasia that underlies my impaired spatial reasoning 
(n.21).  
26 On the embodiment of thought, and the physiological and environmental factors that affect it, 
see van der Eijk 1997.  
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explained by its two-stage aetiology: climate affects thumos, and thumos affects 
practical deliberation. 
(b) The role of thumos 
Thumos, like appetitive desire (™piqum…a), is a function of the non-rational 
part of the soul which we share with non-human animals (NE 3.2, 1111b11f.; EE 
2.10, 1225b25-7; DA 3.9, 432b6). However, the non-reasoning part of the human 
soul is responsive to reason, and both thumos and appetite may arise in response 
to reasoned judgement. In non-human animals, appetitive desires are prompted by 
the perception that something is pleasant; in humans, desire may also be prompted 
by a reasoned judgement to the same effect. But what is it that evokes a spirited 
response? Aristotle’s comments on thumos are sparse. It is associated with fear 
and anger (Top. 4.5, 126a8-10); with reactions to insult and injustice (Pol. 7.7, 
1328a1-16; NE 7.6, 1149a32f.); it reacts with particular intensity to insult and 
injustice from friends—but, conversely, it also makes us affectionate towards 
those familiar to us (Pol. 7.7, 1327b36-8a1); and it equips us to rule over others, 
and to exercise our own independence (Pol. 7.7, 1328a6f.). This is, at first sight, a 
disparate set of functions. Their underlying coherence may be more readily 
apparent in the comparatively simple structure of a non-human primate society. A 
chimpanzee community is a network of vertical and horizontal relationships 
(dominance and subordination, alliance and rivalry) that are maintained by fear, 
which inhibits violations of those relationships, and anger, which punishes them, 
and by affiliative behaviours such as reciprocal grooming, which maintain 
positive relationships and avert—or aid recovery from—hostile interactions.27 
Fear, anger and affiliation are the impulses which regulate the social structure; and 
these are precisely the domain of thumos in Aristotle’s account.28 Thumos 
underpins a set of dispositions which are fundamental to maintaining the dynamic 
stability of a social network. 
Among humans, obviously, reason can generate a more complex set of inputs 
into this set of dispositions. This may help us to understand what Aristotle means 
when he speaks of thumos ‘as it were reasoning (sullogis£menoj)’ before 
reacting, so that in a sense it listens to reason in a way that appetitive desire does 
not (NE 7.6, 1149a24-b3). Appetitive desire may respond to reasoned judgements 
about pleasure, but that is a value that also exists for non-reasoning animals; 
thumos, by contrast, can respond to judgements about values that are dependent 
                                                 
27 A brief and vivid account in Boehm 1999, 16-29 (which, however, says little about affiliative 
interactions). For more detail see (e.g.) Goodall 1986; Boesch and Boesch-Achermann 1999; de 
Waal 1982, 1989. 
28 A community’s internal cohesion may be reinforced by hostility towards outsiders. Isocrates 
reports that the Triballians are unique in their degree of internal solidarity, but exceptionally 
aggressive towards all outsiders (Panath. 227). Plato, concerned that his Guardians’ spiritedness 
might make them aggressive towards fellow-citizens as well as strangers, commends the 
philosophical discrimination of dogs as a model (Rep. 2, 375b-6c). Aristotle, however, denies that 
fierceness towards strangers is a proper counterpart to affection towards familiars (Pol. 7.7, 
1328a8-10). Hostile intergroup relations are characteristic of chimpanzees, though less so of the 
closely related bonobos (Wilson and Wrangham 2003).  
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on reason, including ethical values.29 On the other hand, thumos is not always 
correct in its response to reasoned input. Aristotle compares it to an over-eager 
servant who rushes to do your bidding before you have finished giving your 
instructions, and so ends up doing the wrong thing (NE 7.6, 1149a25-8). A spirited 
response may be impulsive, and thus pre-empt reasoned reflection. Yet thumos is 
indispensable. If people are to be easily guided towards virtue, they must be both 
naturally intelligent and spirited (Pol. 7.7, 1327b36-8). In fact, they need to be 
like Greeks, not like Europeans or Asiatics. Problems arise when thumos deviates 
from the mean in one direction or another; for if thumos adapts people to virtue, 
deviations will be maladaptive. On the interpretation I have outlined, they will be 
maladaptive by disrupting the capacity for practical deliberation.  
(c) The example of courage 
If thumos is conducive to virtue in general (Pol. 7.7, 1327b36-8), one would 
expect it to be implicated in all virtues. But Aristotle does not spell out this 
involvement in most of his analyses of particular virtues. One case in which it is 
obvious is mildness (praÒthj): the deviant dispositions react too little or too 
much to things that ought to evoke thumos-related distress, such as displays of 
contempt or insult (EE 3.3, 1231b6-15). The more complex example of courage 
may help to clarify the effect. You act with genuine courage if by deliberated 
choice you face things that are properly sources of fear (paradigmatically, death in 
battle) because it is kalon to do so.30 Courage requires more than a rational 
acknowledgement that a certain act should be performed because of to kalon; the 
non-rational part of the soul must make a contribution: ‘brave men act because of 
to kalon, but thumos collaborates with them’ (NE 3.8, 1116b30-2). But the 
element of deliberated choice is essential. If someone is motivated to face dangers 
purely by thumos, that is not genuine courage (NE 3.8, 1116b23-7a9; EE 3.1, 
1229b27-30). It would be courage with the addition of prohairesis and ‘that for 
the sake of which’ (tÕ oá ›neka: NE 3.8, 1117a4f.). But since there is no 
deliberation, there is no prohairesis;31 and if the action is not chosen, then of 
course it is not chosen for the sake of to kalon (NE 3.8, 1117a8f.).  
One would expect Europeans to be prone to this kind of pseudo-courage. 
Their excessively stimulated thumos will make them generally impulsive: 
stopping to think is not their (I should, of course, say ‘our’) strong point. That 
explains their failure to display technical and theoretical rationality; it also makes 
it difficult for them to engage in practical reasoning. They will often not stop to 
                                                 
29 I am cautious about the stronger correlation of thumos with to kalon proposed by Cooper 1996. 
There is thumos-motivated action which is not concerned with to kalon (see the discussion of 
courage below); NE 1.13 suggests that we should think of the non-reasoning part of the human 
soul as distinguished by an openness to, not a special focus on, reasoned values. Cooper’s position 
is rescued by a crucial qualification: ‘in the specific case of the morally virtuous person’ (266; cf. 
276 ‘only for the morally virtuous person’). But this means that Cooper fails to provide a general 
account of Aristotelian thumos. Attempts to modify Cooper’s position so as to extend its scope can 
be found in Sihvola 1996; Lorenz 2006, 189-94.  
30 NE 3.7, 1115b12-13, 20-4; 3.8, 1116b2-3; 3.9, 1117b9, 13-15; 10.8, 1178b12-13; EE 3.1, 
1229a1-9. On the role of to kalon in motivating courage see Rogers 1994. 
31 Acts motivated by thumos have least to do with prohairesis (NE 3.2, 1111b18-19).  
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deliberate at all, but they will find it particularly difficult to engage in the complex 
reasoning required for global deliberation, in which an interim conclusion (I 
should give the hungry person this food) must be sensitive to possibly conflicting 
considerations in a more global perspective (this food is not mine). 
By contrast, Asiatics have no trouble stopping to think: they have not got 
enough thumos to get in the way. That is why they are good at technical and 
theoretical thinking. So one might predict that they would not be prone to thumos-
motivated pseudo-courage. But Aristotle says that ‘in general non-Greek courage 
is with thumos’ (EE 3.1, 1229b29f.). This may mean simply that, since Asiatics 
are rarely willing to confront dangers, they contribute only a small minority of 
non-Greek acts of ‘courage’. Alternatively, it may be that they are rarely willing to 
do so unless their generally feeble thumos is sufficiently provoked. Fear is one of 
the things that reside in the spirited part of the soul, and fear can sustain 
aggressive action (as in the case of a cornered animal).32 In any case, Aristotle 
recognises exceptions to his generalisation about non-Greek courage. When 
discussing another inferior analogue to courage, in which danger is endured to 
avoid legal penalty or public disapproval, or to gain honours, he refers to Homeric 
heroes, including the non-Greek Hector (NE 3.8, 1116a17-29; EE 3.1, 1229a12, 
1230a16-21).33 There is a subtle but crucial distinction here. If you do what is 
fine, and will therefore rightly be honoured, because it is fine, you are acting 
virtuously. If you do what is fine, and will therefore rightly be honoured, because 
it will be honoured, your action is instrumental—that is, it is motivated by 
something that it leads to, rather than by its intrinsic value. The collapse of 
practical into technical deliberation will be a particularly easy error for technically 
adept Asiatics to fall into.  
3. Some implications 
(a) Are natural slaves sub-human?  
Aristotle’s theory is taken by some to imply that slaves are ‘subhuman’.34 
Aristotle does not agree: he is in no doubt that they are human (Pol. 1.4, 1254a14-
17; NE 8.11, 1161b5f.); more specifically, they are human and possess rationality 
                                                 
32 Note that natural courage is not the same as thumos-based courage. Animals such as lions have a 
stable natural disposition to act ‘courageously’; Aristotle distinguishes them from spirited animals 
that sporadically erupt in aggressive behaviour, such as wild boars. See esp. HA 1.1, 488b16-17. 
(™leuqšria kaˆ ¢ndre‹a kaˆ eÙgenÁ contrasted with qumèdh kaˆ ™nstatik£). According to Pol. 
8.4, 1338b17-19, animal courage is associated with gentle, lion-like characters, not with extreme 
ferocity.  
33 Diomedes is also mentioned: so this pseudo-courage is not uniquely non-Greek, but is perhaps 
the best that can be expected of non-Greeks. Aristotle attributes Il. 22.100 to Hector (1116a23, 
1230a21), but also 2.391-3 (actually spoken by Agamemnon): presumably he had in mind Hector’s 
threat to Polydamas at 12.250 (cf. sch. bT Il. 13.95). For the assimilation of Homer’s Trojans to 
contemporary non-Greeks cf. Ar. F130 Rose = 386 Gigon (sch. T Il. 16.283); F151 Rose = 375 
Gigon (Porphyry on Il. 4.88, sch. D Il. 4.88); Heraclides of Pontus F172 Wehrli = 100 Schütrumpf 
(Porphyry on Il. 3.236, 1.59.11-29). 
34 Schofield 1999, 139: ‘natural slaves are effectively conceived as subhuman’; Lear 1988, 199: 
‘natural slaves are not fully human’; Garnsey 1996, 113: ‘It seems that natural slavery is some 
kind of subhuman condition.’ 
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(Pol. 1.13, 1259b27f.). It is true that their rationality is impaired, but it is not 
Aristotle who draws the (surprising) inference from cognitive disability to 
subhumanity. It is also true that he correlates slaves with non-human animals 
(qhr…a) in a series of analogies illustrating the existence of natural hierarchies 
(Pol. 1.5, 1254a26, b16-20). But there is no implication that the diverse 
relationships which supply these illustrations are identical in any other respect 
than being natural and hierarchical, nor that the subordinate terms are identical in 
any other respect than being naturally subordinate. Aristotle does say that slaves 
and domestic animals are similar (though not identical), but only in the way they 
are used (Pol. 1.5, 1254b24-6); and that is immediately after he has clearly 
distinguished slaves, who are responsive to reason, from non-human animals, 
which are not (1254b23f.). 
Slaves are, indeed, animals (zùa). So are masters, for mankind is an animal 
species. Specifically, humans are ‘political animals’: that is (in Aristotle’s official 
definition of the term), group-living animals with a ‘shared’ activity (HA 1.1, 
488a7-10). Not all political species have functionally differentiated subgroups: 
flocks of cranes have leaders and sentinels (HA 9.10, 614b18-30), and there is no 
reason to think that these are different kinds of crane. But such differentiation 
does occur, for example, in bees. It is therefore puzzling to read the complaint that 
‘Aristotle, while raising the natural slave somewhat above the animal kingdom, 
has not yet found a category of human to whom he can be appropriately 
compared’.35 For Aristotle, natural slave is a category of human. It would be hard 
to take seriously a complaint that no one has found a category of bee to which 
worker bees can be appropriately compared; and no one imagines that workers are 
sub-apian.36
(b) Are natural slaves unnatural?  
Non-Greeks are natural slaves because of a cognitive impairment caused by 
their environment. One might wonder, therefore, whether they are really natural: 
is the adverse environmental influence not an impediment preventing the 
realisation of the end to which human development naturally tends (Phys. 2.9, 
199b15-18; cf. 2.2, 194a28-30)? If so, is natural servility not contrary to nature? 
The complexity of Aristotle’s use of ‘nature’ blocks that inference. He is willing to 
talk about someone congenitally blind as ‘blind by nature’ (NE 3.5, 1114a26). 
Though congenital blindness is contrary to nature in one sense (it is an impaired 
realisation of the human form), it results from the operation of natural causes (and 
                                                 
35 Garnsey 1996, 115. 
36 It might be objected that, since rationality is an essential human characteristic, its absence or 
impairment must compromise an individual’s humanity. But on the interpretation proposed here, 
natural slaves are rational. They share the reason-dependent capacity to grasp, be motivated by, 
and communicate about values other than pleasure and distress which makes humans more 
political than other animals (Politics 1.2, 1253a7-18). They are able to reason autonomously 
outside the domain of global practical deliberation. The defect which disrupts the exercise of 
rationality within that domain does not imply that intellect (noàj) itself is impaired: compare 
Aristotle’s comments on the effects of senescence and disease on mental and perceptual capacities 
(DA 1.4, 408b18-29). 
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not, for example, from trauma or disease).37 Aristotle makes this distinction when 
he discusses deformed births, terata. A teras is contrary to nature as generality (æj 
™pˆ tÕ polÚ), but not to nature as invariant and necessary (¢eˆ kaˆ ™x ¢n£gkhj); 
so what is contrary to nature in one sense (formal) is by nature in another 
(material). Hence people are less likely to speak of a teras if the deformity is 
frequently recurrent (GA 4.4, 770b9-27). Women are a case in point. Aristotle 
thinks that females are imperfectly formed. They are not deformities (terata), but 
being female is a ‘natural impairment’ (¢naphr…a fusik»: GA 4.6, 775a15f.).38  
(c) The teleological dimension 
Aristotle can explain the material conditions which necessitate the generation 
of a female rather than a male animal. He can also explain the existence of 
females teleologically: why it is good that there exist inferior females as well as 
superior males (GA 2.1, 731b18-24). One might think that the answer is obvious: 
both are needed for reproduction. But that is superficial: since there are species 
that reproduce asexually, it is sexual reproduction itself that needs to be 
explained.39 A modern explanation would be evolutionary: it would try to show 
that sexual reproduction is advantageous under natural selection. But when 
Aristotle says that the division between males and females in sexually 
reproducing species exists because it is better that way, there is no suggestion that 
an asexually reproducing species would be less good at surviving. In Aristotle’s 
theory of reproduction, the male parent supplies form, the female parent supplies 
matter; form is superior to matter; and ‘it is better that the superior principle 
should be separated from the inferior’ (GA 2.1, 732a3-9).40
Women and slaves are both inferior; but they are not inferior in the same way. 
The fact that non-Greeks treat their wives as they treat their slaves is symptomatic 
of the impossibility of sustaining proper patterns of social relationships in 
communities consisting entirely of natural slaves (Pol. 1.2, 1252b5-9).41 The 
normative husband-wife relationship is not despotic, like the relationship of 
master to slave, but constitutional (Pol. 1.12, 1259a39-b3), or more precisely 
aristocratic (NE 8.10, 1160b32-61a1; EE 7.9, 1241b27-32).42 The difference 
                                                 
37 Compare NE 7.5, 1149a9-11, contrasting the distant non-Greeks whose irrationality is congenital 
and natural (™k fÚsewj) with people whose irrationality is due to disease.  
38 MacDowell (n.1) is embarrassed by Aristotle’s views on women, too. Mayhew 2004 provides a 
more sympathetic discussion of Aristotle’s misconceptions; but note the justified reservations in 
Henry 2007.  
39 In GA 4.3, 767b8-10 Aristotle is addressing the problem of why offspring do not invariably take 
after their fathers. His solution is that there must be mechanisms to ensure that this happens, since 
the birth of females is (hypothetically) necessary for the continued existence of sexually 
reproducing species. Sexual reproduction is presupposed in this argument, and one must look 
elsewhere for the explanation. 
40 On this argument see Henry 2007, 273-8. 
41 Despotic treatment of wives is attributed to non-Greeks in general; despotic (rather than 
monarchical) treatment of sons is specifically Persian (NE 8.10, 1160b24-30). Perhaps spirited 
European sons would not submit to despotic rule.  
42 The constitutional model is not perfect: crucially, there is no exchange of roles in the husband-
wife relationship, since the wife is perpetually subordinate. In this respect the aristocratic model is 
more satisfactory (cf. Schofield 1999, 140). It remains true that there is a sphere in which it is 
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between women and slaves reflects the fact that nature is not stingy: it does not 
provide one all-purpose tool, but a range of specialised tools (Pol. 1.2, 1252a34-
b5). The existence of functionally differentiated human subgroups is therefore 
favoured by nature. But this implies that the existence of natural slaves is just as 
much due to nature’s generosity as the existence of women, and equally open to 
teleological explanation. 
Is that inference one that can be attributed to Aristotle? It is, on the face of it, 
consistent with his claim that both the hunting of animals and the subduing of 
natural slaves are natural forms of acquisition. This claim is made at the end of a 
passage (Pol. 1.9, 1256b7-26) whose teleological implications have proved 
controversial, even when the application to slavery is left out of account.43 But the 
prima facie case for including slaves in nature’s bounty seems strong. Aristotle’s 
argument begins with nature’s provision of sources of nutrition (for example, 
milk) for neonates as yet unable to fend for themselves. The second stage draws 
an analogy (éste Ðmo…wj b15) between this and nature’s provision of plants as 
sources of food for animals, and of animals as sources of food, clothing and tools 
for humans. The final stage infers from this (diÕ b23) that hunting animals and 
subduing natural slaves are natural forms of acquisition. Aristotle shows no sign 
of regarding the analogy between the first and second stages as anything less than 
robust; and if it were not robust, the concluding inference to the naturalness of 
enslavement would be compromised. Yet the naturalness of enslavement is crucial 
to his defence of slavery. I am therefore not convinced that it is possible to 
reconcile the implications of this passage with a restrictive account of the scope of 
Aristotle’s natural teleology.44
To the extent that restrictive readings are motivated by a sense of what we 
find ‘quite bizarre... hard to find plausible’,45 they founder on Aristotle’s manifest 
willingness to adopt positions that are, from our perspective, undeniably bizarre 
and implausible. The explanation of sexual reproduction in GA 2.1, 732a3-9 is a 
                                                                                                                                     
appropriate that the wife should exercise control and in which it would be wrong for the husband 
to seize control (NE 8.10, 1160b34-1a). Hence husband-wife relationships raise questions of 
justice (NE 8.12, 1162a29-31), which do not arise in the master-slave relationship (NE 8.11, 
1161a32-b5; cf. NE 5.6, 1134b8-18). Aristotle adds the qualification that, although there is no 
justice towards the slave qua slave, there is qua human (NE 8.11, 1161b5-8). There is no 
contradiction here (as claimed by Schofield 1999, 124). A wife has entitlements qua wife that she 
does not have qua human; the slave has no such status-dependent entitlements, but does not lose 
the entitlements he has qua human. Aristotle, of course, does not believe that enslavement 
infringes the human rights of a natural slave: freedom is an entitlement that individuals possess 
qua naturally free, not qua human. But it is wrong to hunt humans for food or sacrifice qua 
humans (Pol. 7.2, 1324b39-41, noted by Kraut 1996, 759). Less dramatically, failing to honour a 
conditional promise made to a slave (e.g. of freedom in return for meritorious service) would be 
unjust, since in meeting the condition the slave would have acted as a party to a contract 
(sunq»kh: NE 8.11, 1106b6-7). Admittedly, Schofield denies that natural slaves can enter into 
contracts (1999, 139); but he is assuming a more radical incapacity for deliberation than (on my 
interpretation) Aristotle claims. 
43 Sedley 1991, 180 tactfully curtails the passage before the mention of slaves; so too Cooper 
1982, 218. Owens 1968, 168-70 does take account of it.  
44 E.g. Judson 2005, 348 (‘only to the generation, functioning, and parts of natural substances’). 
45 Judson 2005, 341 (exempli gratia).  
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case in point. That is by no means the only occasion on which Aristotle appeals to 
‘the better’ as an explanatory resource. A striking example is his thesis that nature 
assigns protective covering to the better and ‘more honourable’ side of an animal, 
unless the less honourable side needs more protection (PA 2.14, 658a19-24). In 
other words, hair is found on the back of quadrupeds because this confers a 
survival advantage; but hair on the front of humans is ‘better’, for reasons 
unrelated to survival. The human norm needs no further explanation; it is the fact 
that quadrupeds depart from the arrangement which is in principle ‘better’ that 
needs special explanation in terms of the constraints imposed by survival.46 
Cooper, having argued that ‘the principle of the preservation of the species’ is the 
key to Aristotle’s natural teleology, acknowledges that he is left with a residue of 
passages such as these in which ‘the good aimed at... is not any living thing’s 
good, in the sense of its survival or well-functioning’; he concludes that ‘we have 
to do here with two separate aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy of nature, and no 
unified account of them is presumably to be looked for’.47 It is certainly 
impossible to integrate the residual passages into a teleology oriented exclusively 
towards survival, but if approached from the opposite direction the unification 
presents no problem. A teleology oriented towards ‘the better’ automatically 
subsumes survival. Mere survival is a necessary condition of the end, but is not 
itself the end. We live in order to live well.48  
In the case of the division of sexes, Aristotle is able to explain the material 
conditions which necessitate the generation of a female rather than a male; but he 
also argues that the existence of humans who are naturally impaired in the way 
that women are is better. In the same way, he is able to explain the material 
conditions which necessitate the generation of a natural slave rather than a natural 
master. Given that human beings are distributed across the earth, and that different 
regions of the earth have different climates (as a consequence of the movements 
of the heavenly bodies), then it is inevitable that some humans will turn out as 
natural slaves. So it is not possible for all human beings to be natural masters. But 
even if it were possible, it would not be desirable. If servile labour could be 
automated there would be no need for slaves (Pol. 1.4, 1253b33-4a1); but in the 
                                                 
46 Similarly, the fact that up, front and right (cf. Lloyd 1962) are ‘better’ and ‘more honourable’ is 
used to explain the position of internal organs at PA 3.3, 665a22-6; 3.4, 665b18-23; 3.10, 672b19-
24 (applied to the movement of the heavens at DC 2.5, 288a2-12). At PA 4.10, 687a8-19 the 
principle of the better is used to establish the explanatory priority of intelligence over hands, 
against Anaxagoras.  
47 Cooper 1982, 216, 220-1.  
48 Contrast the profoundly un-Aristotelian assumption that only survival is in question in Johnson 
2005, 235: ‘Acquisition is natural insofar as it is necessary to provide for things needed in order to 
live. But it is not natural if it is not necessary for survival.’ Earlier on the same page, he had 
spoken more correctly of ‘survival and flourishing’. Strangely, the truncated formula appears 
immediately after Johnson has quoted Aristotle’s statement that natural acquisition provides ‘what 
is necessary for life and useful for the community of city or household’ (Pol. 1.8, 1256b26-30); but 
the city exists for the sake of living well (not just living): Pol. 1.2, 1252b29-30; 1.4, 1253b24-5; 
3.9, 1280a31-2. Cf. PA 2.10, 656a6f.; Protr. F53.5 Düring = Iambl. 40.6-7. As Johnson notes a 
little later (239), the goal of living well is what differentiates the political existence of free humans 
from that of natural slaves and of nonhuman animals. 
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absence of satisfactory non-utopian substitutes for servile labour,49 a world in 
which all humans were naturally masters would make it impossible for anyone to 
live a good human life. If no one was enslaved, then everyone would have to do 
their own labour, and no one would have the leisure needed to cultivate virtue 
(Pol. 7.9, 1329a1). But enslaving people who were not natural slaves would be 
unjust, creating an internal contradiction even more fundamentally subversive of 
the good life. So it would be reasonable for Aristotle to conclude that that the 
existence of humans who are naturally impaired in the way that natural slaves are 
is better. Some humans have a capacity for living well that cannot be fully 
realised without the support of servile labour. If human excellence is to be 
achieved in its highest form, therefore, it is hypothetically necessary (Phys. 2.9, 
199b34-200b8) that natural slaves exist. Without natural slaves, the masters’ 
natural capacity for eudaimonia would be frustrated; and nature does nothing in 
vain (Pol. 1.9, 1256b20-1).50  
(d) How does the slave benefit from slavery?  
The existence of natural slaves, then, is for the better. That is to say, it is better 
for masters that natural slaves exist, because it makes it possible for them to live 
better lives. Is the existence of natural slaves also good for the slaves? Aristotle 
certainly thinks that being enslaved is good for natural slaves. He is not under the 
illusion that slavery exists in order to benefit natural slaves: the benefit which the 
slave gains from being enslaved is incidental (Pol. 3.6, 1278b32-37; cf. 1.5, 
1254b39-5a2); but it is beneficial, even so. However, being enslaved is not the 
same as being a natural slave. Most natural slaves live in their own communities, 
in which everyone is a natural slave (Pol. 1.2, 1252b5-9); so they never gain the 
benefit of being enslaved to a natural master. The majority of natural slaves 
therefore suffer from an uncompensated impairment. So the answer to my 
question may seem self-evident: the existence of natural slaves is not good for the 
slaves. On the other hand, the advantages of being naturally free could not be 
realised if there were no natural slaves. So while any individual natural slave 
would have been better off if he had been born naturally free, he would not have 
been better off if everyone had been born naturally free. The existence of natural 
                                                 
49 The implication (Pol. 1.2, 1252a26-31) that the master cannot exist without the slave is 
overstated: it is possible to rely on animal or family labour (Pol. 1.2, 1252b12; 6.8, 1323a5-6). But 
these are makeshifts available to the poor (pšnhtej, ¥poroi), not satisfactory substitutes.  
50 This teleology is ‘anthropocentric’ in one sense: ‘man is the ultimate beneficiary’ (Sedley 1991, 
180)—more precisely, in the light of the present discussion, some human beings. But there is no 
implication that the natural order is wholly, primarily or exclusively for human benefit, as some of 
Sedley’s critics have alleged (e.g. Judson 2005, 357, 361 n.66; Johnson 2005, 232-7). A ‘cosmic’ 
teleology (Kahn 1985) would be contestable if it required taking the cosmos as a single substance 
or beneficiary (Sedley 2000; cf. Matthen 2001). But for present purposes we need only suppose 
that different entities, each independently pursuing its own good, may through their interactions 
give rise to a higher-order good—namely, a natural order in which it is possible for those entities 
to achieve their respective goods; and it is reasonably clear that Aristotle believes that the cosmos 
does exemplify such an order, by virtue of the joint relationship of all its constituent entities to a 
single ultimate good (Met. 12.10, 1075a11-22). See further Bodnár 2005. It is worth noting that 
axiological explanation, though generally out of favour, does not entirely lack modern defenders: 
Rescher 2000, 149-79. 
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slaves is not good for the slaves; but the non-existence of natural slaves would not 
have been good for anyone. 
How exactly does the natural slave benefit from enslavement? On the face of 
it, the advantage is all on the other side of the relationship. The slave is used to 
fulfil basic functions for the master (Pol. 1.5, 1254b28f.; 1.13, 1260a33f.); this 
frees the master from the burden of low-grade labour to supply what is merely 
necessary, and gives him time to devote himself to what is kalon—action that is 
intrinsically worthwhile. This might be a life centred on theoretical contemplation, 
which is the paradigm of human well-being (NE 10.8, 1178b33); or it might be a 
life centred on political activity, which Aristotle acknowledges as a secondary 
(though still genuine) kind of human well-being (NE 10.8, 1178a9f.).51 From the 
master’s point of view, therefore, the slave is instrumental in his living an 
intrinsically worthwhile life.  
The natural slave is not capable of living such a life. Because he cannot 
deliberate globally in the domain of practical reason, he cannot live a life of 
intrinsically worthwhile activity chosen because of its intrinsic worth. At least, he 
cannot do this on his own: but though deficient in autonomous practical reason, 
the slave may be responsive to another’s practical wisdom. So if he is enslaved to 
a natural master, he is capable of participating in and contributing to an 
intrinsically worthwhile life. He can contribute to the master’s living of a good 
life; his own life thus becomes more worthwhile.  
Aristotle speaks of the slave as a part of the master—even as a separated part 
of the master’s body (Pol. 1.6, 1255b11f.). That sounds strange. But the slave is 
instrumental in the master’s life, and it does not sound so strange to speak of a 
tool as an extension of the body—if, for example, I use a stick as a probe to 
explore an otherwise inaccessible space.52 Prosthetic devices may be external or 
internal: my deficient eyesight is assisted by the lenses in my glasses, and by 
lenses implanted in my eyes. The implants have become part of my body; the 
functionally equivalent external lenses are separated parts of my body. From the 
master’s point of view, then, the slave is ‘as it were a part and detachable tool of 
the master’ (EE 7.9, 1241b22f.);53 specifically, he is a detached instrument for 
action (pr©xij: Pol. 1.4, 1254a1-17).  
                                                 
51 Pol. 1.7, 1255b36-7: those who are able to do so devote themselves to philosophy or politics, 
devolving the management of the household to a steward. The steward is, of course, himself a 
slave. On the interpretation presented here, though he is dependent on his master’s practical 
wisdom for overall guidance about household policy, he is capable of the technical reasoning 
needed to determine how the rest of the slaves should be directed so as to implement that policy. 
Like Xerxes’ generals, he has to be able to solve logistical obstacles to the fulfilment of his 
master’s project; unlike them, he is fortunate enough to have a master who is not himself a natural 
slave. 
52 MA 8, 702b4-6: ‘It makes no difference whether the part is a continuous part of the body or not; 
the stick may be looked at as a detached part of the whole’. Cf. Polanyi 1958, 55-63 (59: ‘Our 
subsidiary awareness of tools and probes can be regarded now as the act of making them form part 
of our own body’). 
53 Aristotle can apply the term ‘tool’ to non-slave subordinates (Pol. 1.4, 1253b28-30). This way of 
speaking just marks the (obvious) fact that one human being can play an instrumental role in 
another human being’s action. Contrast Garnsey 1996, 123: ‘his living tool seems to have very 
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In a sense, that cuts both ways. From the slave’s point of view, the master is 
like my glasses. The master’s guidance compensates for the slave’s impaired 
practical rationality; he is a kind of cognitive prosthesis.54  But there is an 
asymmetry. Using the slave allows the master to exercise his own, unimpaired 
capacities for action; thereby, the master partially compensates for the slave’s 
impairment. But it is the master who masterminds it all: the master uses the slave, 
the slave does not use the master. So it is correct to see the slave as part of the 
master, rather than the other way round (cf. Pol. 1.4, 1254a8-13). Nevertheless, if 
we take the notion of the slave as part of the master seriously (as Aristotle 
evidently did), the master-slave dyad is a single system. The slave becomes an 
enabling part of a system that lives a worthwhile human life. It is the master, not 
the slave, who is the proper subject of that life, but the slave by his instrumentality 
participates in it. His own life therefore becomes more worthwhile: he has 
benefited from enslavement. 
(e) How does the slave benefit from being freed?  
The slave’s benefit is incidental: slavery does not exist for the sake of the 
slave. The master therefore has no obligation to improve a natural slave’s lot by 
enslaving him. If servile labour were automated, there would be no need for 
slaves (Pol. 1.4, 1253b33-4a1), and there would be no reason to take natural 
slaves into captivity. Moreover, although it may seem obvious that, if enslavement 
is to the slave’s benefit, freedom will be detrimental, the incidental nature of the 
benefit means that there is no obligation to keep a slave in slavery if it is in the 
master’s interest to set him free. It may well be in the master’s interest to do so. 
The slave probably does not realise that he is benefiting from being a slave, and 
the prospect of freedom will provide an incentive to serve his master well.55 Yet in 
his will, Aristotle seems to regard freedom as a reward for meritorious slaves.56 
How can that be, if freedom is against the slave’s interests? 
Freedom in the ancient world did not necessarily imply complete autonomy: 
freed slaves typically retained a subordinate relationship to their manumittors.57 
So it is possible that a freedman will still gain the incidental benefit of being a 
subordinate part of a hierarchical relationship. But a deeper solution emerges if we 
consider the slave’s whole life. A limited period of highly motivated and therefore 
superior engagement in a good life is more worthwhile than a longer, but less 
                                                                                                                                     
little that is human about it.’ See also NE 5.6, 1134b10, where both property and children are ‘part’ 
of the father.  
54 Compare the ‘active externalist’ approach to cognition in Clark and Chalmers 1998. 
Background: Rowlands 2003.  
55 Schofield 1999, 217 n.47: ‘natural slaves would usually prefer to be free. That being so, they are 
more likely to cooperate and to work hard if promised their freedom: that is why it is better to hold 
out the prospect—better for masters.’ 
56 D.L. 5.15: ‘Do not sell any of the slaves who took care of me, but employ them; and when they 
reach the appropriate age, set them free as they deserve.’  
57 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005, 339: ‘Although legally free, in social terms the manumitted slaves’ 
actual position was... half way between slavery and freedom... (T)he manumitted slave is not a 
wholly free person. His or her function was to keep working for others; it was his or her natural 
[sic] social position to be dependent on others.’  
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motivated and inferior, contribution. The fact that the slave’s enhanced service is 
in the master’s interest means that it is also (incidentally) in the slave’s interest, 
since it makes the slave’s life (taken as a whole) objectively more worthwhile. So 
the Aristotelian slave-owner and his slave both believe that the slave’s life will be 
better if he is offered the prospect of freedom, though for different reasons. The 
slave’s judgement is likely to be swayed by considerations of his own subjective 
contentment. His master’s judgement is informed by a recognition of the 
increased objective value conferred on the slave’s life by enhanced participation 
in the master’s deliberated ethical praxis.  
Conclusion 
I have argued that Aristotle’s cryptic comments on the natural slave’s 
cognitive impairment can be interpreted in a way that is consistent and plausible, 
relative to things that Aristotle is likely to have believed. On the interpretation 
proposed, the impairment is limited in scope but profound in its effects—precisely 
the combination needed if it is to have the moral and political consequences which 
Aristotle infers, while remaining (from his perspective) empirically plausible. The 
different forms which this impairment take in different populations can be 
explained in terms of the mediation of climatic effects on deliberative reason by 
thumos. Finally, an examination of some of the implications of Aristotle’s theory, 
thus reconstructed, suggests that it is more internally coherent than is usually 
acknowledged; it is also, not least in its teleological implications, much stranger.  
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